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Abstract
Guarantee industry is recognized as the high-risk industry 
in the world, and business risks and personnel risks are 
two main risks that guarantee enterprises face. Nowadays, 
guarantee enterprises in China, have great requirements 
for high quality and ability of the business personnel, but 
the labor market cannot supply enough talented guarantee 
people, and this phenomenon highlights the importance 
and urgency for the guarantee enterprises to provide 
business personnel training programs. This paper uses the 
principal-agent theory to explain the incentive-restricted 
mechanism of preventing department managers’ moral 
hazard under the real condition of information asymmetry, 
and verify the validity of theory model of mathematical 
analysis through an empirical research.
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INTRODUCTION
To solve the financing difficulties of medium and small 
enterprises, credit guarantee is a kind of financial support 
mode used around the world generally. Credit guarantee 
is the acknowledged high-risk industry in the world, 
and the first priority of it is risk prevention and control. 
Preventing personnel risk is highly demanded in the 
guarantee enterprise, and guarantee enterprise lacks 
business backbone in this condition, thus putting forward 
higher requirements for the personnel training work. It 
is very important for assuring the enterprise personnel’s 
stability, personnel risk prevention, and even the entire 
guarantee enterprise’s risk control. 
Presently, most scholars are engaged in research on 
“knowledge sharing” (Siemsen, Balasubramanian, & 
Roth, 2007; Wang & Shao, 2012), and the pure knowledge 
transfer research is relatively few. There is a fraction 
of knowledge transfer research under the framework of 
knowledge sharing (Lin, Zhang, & Pu, 2008; Luo & Yin, 
2009; Mu & Zhang, 2011). Some research is dedicated 
to studying the process and mechanism of knowledge 
transfer (Zhou, Zhang, & Zhang, 2008). Some focuses 
more on the way and approach to knowledge transfer and 
efficiency of the model (Osterloh & Frey, 2000; Marino, 
2011). This paper will discuss that the high-risk guarantee 
enterprises, by using principal-agent theory and divided 
the business manager into two kinds of cases such as 
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risk neutral and risk aversion, impel department manager 
(agent) to offer security knowledge and experience as 
much as possible, thus making subordinates (especially 
the new employees) become mature faster in business, and 
finally the enterprise will achieve the aim of controlling 
guarantee risk by preventing personnel risk. 
1.  INCENTIVE-RESTRICTED MECHANISM 
OF DEPARTMENT MANAGER’S MORAL 
HAZARD PREVENTION AND CONTROL IN 
GUARANTEE ENTERPRISE 
In relationships between agents and principals, agents 
take the behavior that the principals dislike, and the moral 
risk behavior emerges after they have signed a contract. 
For example, agents hide their information or action, this 
behavior belongs to moral hazard problems (Chen, 2010). 
Department manager imparting guarantee knowledge and 
experience will lower rareness and value of his knowledge 
in the organization. It will also threaten his career living 
space. So department manager will retain his guarantee 
knowledge and experience, after weighing the pros and 
cons, and this action cannot be observed by the executives. 
It is introduced according to the insiders, the personnel 
risks of guarantee enterprise mainly include: personnel 
vocational moral risk, personnel risk results from 
insufficient quality and ability and lack of responsibility. 
Among three types of risks,professional ethics and 
responsibility problem occur after signing the principal-
agent contract, they are not easy for the principal to 
observe and control, these behaviors belong to the typical 
problems of moral risks in the principal-agent theory. 
For the quality ability shortage problem of department 
managers, in most cases, the formation of quality and 
ability is before signing a contract, but the behavior 
resulted from quality takes place after signing it. This 
happens like that the poor quality of department manager 
makes training ineffective, or cannot help to improve the 
quality of trainee significantly. The employees’ operation 
risks in the follow-up work of the guarantee business will 
increase with this, and this complex training process is 
hard to be seen and controlled by executives. Therefore, 
the problem, the poor quality ability of department 
manager can regard as a kind of moral risks. So, the paper 
argues that these three risks possible to happen all belong 
to moral risk category in economics. Moral risk in classic 
principal-agent theory should be generalized, but not be 
confined to profession ethics risk.
1.1  Basic Incentive Model Building
1.1.1  Guarantee Knowledge Output Function
According to Griliches (1979) knowledge production 
model, and on the base of the reality of business 
department manager’s moral risk in guarantee enterprise 
analyzed above, this paper assumes the department 
manager’s guarantee knowledge output is a linear function 
of its effort represented as e. In addition, other exterior 
and random factors also have an effect on this function. 
We can suppose that random factors belong to normal 
distribution with expect 0 and variance σ2, then the 
guarantee knowledge output function can be expressed as: 
  ,e kdmper i i= +^ h   (1)
Among this function, ,e kdmper i i= +^ h  means the department 
manager guarantee knowledge output; k, the output 
coefficient of guarantee knowledge, it is constant and 
greater than zero; inspired by the study of Stevens and 
Thevaranjan (2010), this article adds the responsibility 
factor d to the above model, ,d 0 11 6 @ , when d=0, it 
means that department manager is of no responsibility 
completely; when d=1, it means the department manager 
is the most responsible. Moral sensitive factor, m is also 
added to the model, m is constant and 0≤m≤1, when 
m is equal to zero, it says that the department manager 
is opportunity egoism, and absolutely with no moral 
sense, no desire to take any responsibility for training 
employees, when m=1, it says that the department 
manager is of the strongest moral sense, and positive 
to assume the obligations for training employees. p is 
the ability coefficient of department manager imparting 
guarantee knowledge, it’s constant and p>0, closer p tend 
to zero, more insufficient his quality ability is; e is the 
effort level of department manager; it is variable and e≥1 
(“1” says the department manager does not make any 
effort) (Hsu, 2006). θ is the other random factors which 
influence the output of guarantee knowledge, and θ～ 
(0,σ2), E(θ)=0,D(θ)=σ2. Guarantee knowledge output 
function has the following conclusion, with the increasing 
of effort, output of guarantee knowledge is increasing, and 
the added rate is increasing, too, so the output difficulty is 
also incremental.
1.1.2  Managers’ Effort Cost Function
In the process of training new employees, the department 
manager needs effort, such as training stuff members, 
course preparation, answering question, etc. His effort 
needs cost, analyzing in brief, this paper will not consider 
the influence of random factors. This paper uses the 
study of Hsu (2006), and assumes that the effort cost of 
department manager like: 
  ( )c e e
2
2c
=   (2)
c(e) is the effort cost of department manager, and can 
be equivalent to the monetary cost; e is the effort level of 
him, and e≥1; γ is the effort cost coefficient, and γ > 0. 
Seeing this function, we can say, with the increasing of 
effort, the effort cost is rising, and the increasing rate of 
cost is rising, too.
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1.1.3  Incentive Contract Function
The guarantee enterprises need to give the department 
manager some incentive compensation, in order to 
encourage him to impart knowledge positively. Presently, 
the study of incentive mechanism uses the linear contract 
(Siemsen, 2007), which proved to have Robust by 
Holmstrom & Milgrom(1987). So this paper also uses 
this type:
  ( )s r a br= +  (3)
Among this model, π denotes the output of department 
manager’s guarantee knowledge, π(e,θ), α  is his fixed 
salary and has nothing to do with π; β is the incentive 
coefficient of guarantee knowledge of department 
manager, and 0≤β≤1, namely, it is about the extent of 
department manager taking risks. When β=0, it means that 
department manager does not take any risk and knowledge 
output, and when β=1, it says he assumes all the risks and 
knowledge output.
1.1.4  The Expected Utility Function 
The actual benefit of employee is w1 = π-s(π) = (1-β)kdmpqe-
βθ+θ-α. Suppose that the employee is risk neutral, 
and the expected utility is the same with the expected 
income. The expected utility function is Ev(w1) = Ew1 = 
(1-β)kdmpe-β-α, in this function, 1w is the real benefit. 
The real profit of department manager is w2=s(π)-
c(e)=α+β(kdmpe+θ)- e
2
2c , when the department manager 
is also risk neutral, his expected utility is equal to his 
expected income, i.e., Eu(w2)=Ew2=α+βkdmpe-
e
2
2c . 
When the department manager is risk aversion, according 
to the conclusion of Hsu (2006) research, risk cost is 
F
2
2 2tb v
= , then the department manager’s utility 
function is Ew F kdmpe e
2 22
2 2 2
a b
c tb v
- = + - - .
1.2  Basic Incentive Model
According to the assumption above, when the employee 
maximize the expected utility, the individual rational 
constraint IR and harmonic control IC will restrict him. 
IR means the expected utility when the department 
manager accepts the employee contract is not less than 
that when the department manager refuses it; IC means 
the department manager always considers from the angle 
of personal benefit maximization, and chooses the effort 
level which can maximizes the expected utility. u  is the 
reservation utility of department manager.
  ( )max kdmpe1
, ,a
b b a- - -
a b
6 @ (4)
s.t. 
2
2
ekdmpe uγα β+ − ≥ ，(risk neutral)
2 2 2
2 2
ekdmpe uγ ρβ σα β+ − − ≥ ，(risk aversion)
(IR)  (5)
2
arg max( )
2
ee kdmpe γα β∈ + − (risk neutral)
2 2 2
arg max( )
2 2
ee kdmpe γ ρβ σα β∈ + − − , (risk aversion)
(IC)
,
 (6)
2 .   I N C E N T I V E - R E S T R I C T E D 
MECHANISM UNDER THE CONDITION 
OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
In the real and most cases, the information between 
principle and agent is asymmetry. So this paper mainly 
studies the incentive and restraint mechanism of 
department manager transferring knowledge under the 
condition of information asymmetry. We will study 
by dividing the manager’s attitude towards risk into 
two occasions, “risk neutral” and “risk aversion”. The 
guarantee enterprises cannot observe the effort level of 
department manager, when the information is asymmetric. 
And the guarantee corporation cannot force the manager 
to dedicate his knowledge out, but can induce the 
manager to do this through incentive contraction s(π). In 
the best cases, the IR constraint equation is established, 
IC conditions can be replaced by optimize first-order 
partial derivative of e (Mirrlees, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979), 
kdmpe β
γ
= .
2.1  Incentive and Restraint Mechanism When the 
Department Manager Is Risk-Neutral
When the department manager is risk-neutral, the 
optimization problem can be transformed into this:
 ( )max kdmpe1
, ,a
b b a- - -
a b
6 @ (7)
 
2
2
ekdmpe uγα β+ − = (IR） (IR) (8)
 
kdmpe β
γ
= (IC)     (I )  (9)
We can generate the individual rational conditions 
(15) and incentive compatibility condition (16) into the 
objective function (14), and his first order derivative is 
equal to zero( partial derivative of β)
2
22
( ) 1
( ) ( )
kdmp
kdmp kdmp
λ γβ −= = −  (10)
2( )kdmpe
kdmp
γ
γ
−
= ,
2 2 2
2
( ) [( ) ]
2 ( )
kdmp kdmpu
kdmp kdmp
γ γα
γ
− −
= + −
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We can see from type (10), the guarantee enterprises 
provide incentives in accordance with the excitation 
intensity of β, offer effort level of e, if we want to get 
the best incentive effect, that is β→1, there exist two 
patterns: on the one hand, it just needs γ→0( the effort 
cost coefficient of department manager approaches to 
zero), and d≠0, m≠0, apparently, this is inconsistent 
logically; on the other hand, if γ is a constant number, it 
needs (kdmp)2→∞, that is to say, d, m→1 and k, p→∞ 
(the guarantee knowledge quantity department manager 
owned, knowledge imparting ability, capacity of new 
employees absorbing knowledge, the value of these 
factors is the bigger, the better). In addition, when 
γ＞(kdmp)2, 2 1( )kdmp
γ
> , then, β<0, but actually 0≤β≤1, 
so the incentive mechanism will lose effectiveness.
2.2  Incentive-Restricted Mechanism Under 
the Condition of Risk Aversion of Department 
Manager
When department manager is risk-aversion, optimization 
problem can be transformed into:
 , ,max[(1 ) ]a kdmpeα β β β α− − −  (11)
 
2 2 2
2 2
ekdmpe uγ ρβ σα β+ − − ≥ (IR)       (12)
 
kdmpe β
γ
= (IC) (I )  (13)
We can generate individual rational conditions (12) 
and incentive compatibility condition (13) into the 
objective function (11), and make its first order derivative 
be zero (partial derivative of β)
  
2
2
( )kdmp
kdmp
γβ
γρσ
−
=
+
 (14) 
  
2
2 2
[ ( ) ]kdmp kdmpe
kdmp
γ
γ γ ρσ
−
=
−
 (15)
2.3  Affect Trend of Influence Factors on the 
Department Manager’s Excitation Intensity 
The influence factors are involved in the expressions (10) 
and (14) about excitation intensity β. This paper focuses 
on studying the influence of department manager effort-
cost coefficient γ, coefficient k of guarantee knowledge 
level owned by the enterprise, the department manager 
responsibility coefficient d, the department manager moral 
sensitivity m, the department manager’s risk aversion 
degree ρ and guarantee business risk stability σ2 on the 
excitation intensity β.
2.3.1  Conditions of the Department Manager for Risk 
Neutral
Use the excitation intensity 21 ( )kdmp
γβ = −  of expression 
(10) to take the derivative of γ, k, d, m, p respectively, and 
judge positive and negative.
2
1
( )kdmp
β
γ
∂
= −
∂
＜0, this value means that when 
department manager is in risk neutral, his excitation 
intensity will decrease with the increase of effort-
cost coefficient. 
2
3 2
2 2 ( ) 4
( )
k dmp
k kdmp dmpk
β γ γ∂
= =
∂
＞0, this 
value means that when department manager is in risk 
neutral, his incentive strength should increase with the 
guarantee knowledge level of security company adding. 
2
3 2
2 2 ( ) 4
( )
d kmp
d kdmp kmpd
β γ γ∂
= =
∂
＞0, this value means that 
when department manager is in risk neutral, his excitation 
intensity will increase with the department manager’s 
sense of responsibility fortifying. 2
4
m dkpm
β γ∂
=
∂
＞0, this 
value means that if the department manager is in risk 
neutral and his moral sensitivity is improving, his 
incentive strength should increase. 2
4
p dkmp
β γ∂
=
∂
＞0, this 
value shows that if the department manager is in risk 
neutral and his ability of imparting guarantee knowledge 
is enhancing, his excitation intensity will increased.
2.3.2  Conditions of the Department Manager for Risk 
Aversion
Use the excitation intensity 
2
2 2
( )
( )
kdmp
kdmp
γβ
γρσ
−
=
+
 of 
expression (14) to take the derivative of γ, k, d, m, p, σ2 
respectively, and judge positive and negative.
2 2
2 2 2
( ) (1 )
[( ) ]
kdmp
kdmp
β ρσ
γ γρσ
∂ +
= −
∂ +
＜0,  th i s  va lue  means 
that when department manager is in risk aversion, his 
excitation intensity will decrease with the increasing of 
effort-cost coefficient. 
2 2
2 2 2
2 ( ) ( 1) 0
[( ) ]
k dmp
k kdmp
β γ ρσ
γρσ
∂ +
= 〉
∂ +
＞0, 
this value means that when department manager is in 
risk aversion, his incentive strength should increase 
with the guarantee knowledge level  of  securi ty 
company adding. 
2 2
2 2 2
2 ( ) ( 1)
[( ) ]
d kmp
d kdmp
β γ ρσ
γρσ
∂ +
=
∂ +
＞0, this 
value means that when department manager is in risk 
aversion, his excitation intensity will increase with the 
department manager’s sense of responsibility fortifying. 
2 2
2 2 2
2 ( ) ( 1)
[( ) ]
m kdp
m kdmp
β γ ρσ
γρσ
∂ +
=
∂ +
＞0, this value means that if 
the department manager is in risk aversion and his moral 
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sensitivity is improving, his incentive strength should 
increase. 
2 2
2 2 2
2 ( ) ( 1)
[( ) ]
p kdm
p kdmp
β γ ρσ
γρσ
∂ +
=
∂ +
＞0, this value shows 
that if the department manager is in risk aversion 
and his ability of imparting guarantee knowledge is 
enhancing, his excitation intensity should be increased. 
2 2
2 2 2
[ ( ) ]
[( ) ]
kdmp
kdmp
β γ γσ
ρ γρσ
∂ −
=
∂ +
, its sign symbol is not sure, 
when 2( ) 0kdmpγ − 〉＞0, 2 0
β
σ
∂
〉
∂
＞0, this indicates that when 
the department manager is in risk aversion, his excitation 
intensity should increase with his risk-aversion degree 
adding. 
2
2 2 2 2
[ ( ) ]
[( ) ]
kdmp
kdmp
β γ γρ
σ γρσ
∂ −
=
∂ +
, its sign symbol is not 
sure, when 2( ) 0kdmpγ − 〉＞0, 2 0
β
σ
∂
〉
∂
＞0, it shows that when 
department manager is in risk aversion, and guarantee 
business risk changes violently, the manager’s motive 
force will increase.
3.  RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS AND 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Under the condit ion of information asymmetry, 
according to mathematical analysis on the incentive-
restricted mechanism of department manager transferring 
knowledge, this paper may draw the conclusions: (a) 
No matter department managers are risk-aversion or 
risk-neutral, the excitation intensity will decrease with 
their effort-cost coefficient increasing. (b) No matter 
department managers are risk-aversion or risk-neutral, 
the excitation intensity will add if coefficient of guarantee 
knowledge level, department manager’s responsibility 
and ability of imparting knowledge increase. (c) When 
department manager is risk-aversion, with the increase of 
risk-aversion degree, the changing extent of security risk 
is aggravating, and the excitation intensity cannot be sure. 
(d) Through the empirical test, on the one hand, it verified 
the study results above; on the other hand, it showed 
the excitation intensity risk attitude (risk neutral or risk 
aversion) is irrelevant with department manager’s attitude 
towards risk (risk neutral or risk aversion).
The above research conclusion can use for reference 
in the management practice of guarantee enterprise as 
follows: (a) Not all of the department managers’ effort 
can transfer into results effectively in their transferring 
guarantee knowledge. In this paper, the increasing 
of effort-cost coefficient means that the efficiency of 
department manager’s effort transferring into effective 
labor results is lowering, and effort cost is rising, so the 
net utility value of department manager is decreasing, 
the excitation intensity reduces correspondingly, this 
encourage him to improve the transferring efficiency, 
reduce unnecessary invalid labor. (b) Knowledge level 
coefficient of guarantee enterprise increases, it means the 
ability of enterprise owning knowledge and operating 
guarantee business is enhancing, and this aspect is the 
outcome of their own efforts of business personnel, 
also inseparable with his efforts of department manager 
imparting knowledge, therefore, we should increase 
the excitation intensity to department manager. But the 
increasing of their responsibility and moral sensitivity 
and imparting knowledge ability need to enhance the 
excitation intensity, which conforms with the actual 
situation. (c) Risk-aversion degree adding indicates that 
manager imparting knowledge tends to be conservative, 
this paper says this conservation results from concerning 
on their own interests. So this paper thinks that, if 
financial capability is good enough to give managers 
some benefit compensation, we should do it to encourage 
them to devote their guarantee knowledge voluntarily. 
(d) Guarantee-risk variance increasing means that the 
changing degree of guarantee business risk adds, rate of 
risk appearing will fortify. In order to improve their ability 
to identify guarantee risk, it is essential to increase the 
excitation intensity to department managers, encouraging 
them to impart more guarantee knowledge.
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